The world already produces enough. The question is whether we admit it.
Below: four numbers. Each is global production divided by the documented minimum need, per person. Every number links to a primary source — FAO, IEA, IMF, WHO, World Bank, UN-Habitat, SIPRI, UBS — and every redistribution claim cites a peer-reviewed study.
caloric need
basic L/day
Energy Minimum
Bank poverty line
1 · The thesis, in one sentence
For every essential resource where global production data exists, aggregate human production already exceeds aggregate human need — usually by a wide margin. Hunger, homelessness, and energy poverty in 2026 are distribution outcomes, not production outcomes.
This is not a new claim. Amartya Sen won the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics for proving exactly this — that the great famines of the twentieth century, including the 1943 Bengal famine that killed ~3 million people, occurred during years of adequate or above-average food production. Famine, Sen showed, is an entitlement failure: some people lose the legal/economic claim to food while the food is still there. (Sen, A. (1981). Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Oxford University Press.)
This page does not argue policy. It states arithmetic, cites the experiments that have already tested the policy, and points at the scholars who have been making this case for forty years.
2 · The per-capita arithmetic
Divisor everywhere on this page: 8,200,000,000 people, the UN's mid-2024 estimate (WPP 2024). For the per-country breakdown see Abundance · by country → (sortable World Bank data for 30 countries).
Food abundance exists
The Bengal famine of 1943 — the most-studied modern famine — occurred in a year when rice production in Bengal was 13% higher than in 1941, a non-famine year. Grain prices rose more than 300% over four years while agricultural wages rose 30%. People starved because the money they earned could no longer buy the food that physically existed. Sen's analysis of this and subsequent famines (Ethiopia 1973, Sahel 1968–73, Bangladesh 1974) established the modern consensus that starvation in the modern era is overwhelmingly a problem of access, not production.
Sources: FAOSTAT food balance sheets via Our World in Data · FAO/WHO/UNU energy requirements · SOFI 2025 · FAO + UNEP Food Waste Index 2024 · Sen (1981) Poverty and Famines
Freshwater geographically uneven
Sources: FAO AQUASTAT · WHO domestic water quantity guidelines
Electricity abundance exists
Sources: IEA Electricity 2024 · IEA energy access definitions · Modern Energy Minimum (2020)
Output (GDP) abundance exists
Sources: IMF WEO · World Bank, June 2025 poverty line update
Insulin manufactured scarcity
Insulin was isolated in 1921; the patent was sold to the University of Toronto for $1 by its discoverers, who believed it should belong to the world. A century later, the molecule costs ~$1 to manufacture and ~$90+ to buy in the United States. This is the cleanest single example on the page of manufactured scarcity: there is no physical shortage of insulin. There is a pricing structure protected by patent and supply-chain consolidation.
Source: Barber, Sulis et al (2024). 'Estimated Sustainable Cost-Based Prices for Diabetes Medicines,' JAMA Network Open / MSF Access Campaign · IDF Diabetes Atlas 11th ed.
Internet distribution failure
International bandwidth capacity is 1,835 Tbps (TeleGeography 2024), growing 24%/year, and the laid-but-unlit ("dark") fiber inventory exceeds installed capacity in most countries by multiples. Aggregate capacity is not the constraint. The gap is the 2.6 billion people without affordable access — most of them rural, most of them in low-income countries, where Internet use is 27% vs 93% in rich countries.
Sources: ITU Facts and Figures 2024 · TeleGeography Global Bandwidth Research 2024
Childhood vaccines distribution failure
The supply side of routine childhood immunization is one of the rare areas where global manufacturing capacity already exceeds need by a comfortable margin. The Serum Institute of India alone produces more than 1.5 billion doses per year; UNICEF procures vaccines for ~45% of the world's children at prices of cents-to-dollars per dose. The 14 million zero-dose infants are not a supply problem. They are a cold-chain, conflict, funding-gap, and political-will problem.
Source: WHO/UNICEF Estimates of National Immunization Coverage (WUENIC) 2024 revision · WHO + UNICEF press release, Jul 2025
Housing distribution failure
Unlike food or electricity, there is no single "global housing production" number to divide. But the inverse is well-documented: in many wealthy countries, vacant housing units exceed homeless population by an order of magnitude or more. The shortage is not of walls; it is of walls people are allowed to enter.
3 · The money question
Even if the resources exist, can the financial system move them? Here are three numbers placed next to each other. They are not a policy proposal — they are a sanity check on the claim "we cannot afford it."
Cost of a universal $3/day floor — for every human alive
For comparison: actually closing the gap for the 847M people below the line costs far less, because most of them are not at $0/day; the average poverty gap is roughly $1/day per affected person. Closing the gap costs well under $1 trillion / year — comparable to a single year's growth in global military spending.
Where the money already is
- Global household wealth, 2023: $449.9 trillion (UBS Global Wealth Report 2024). Of that, $213.8T is held by the 58 million people with net worth over $1M — 0.7% of humanity holding 47.5% of the wealth. Cross-confirmed by the World Inequality Lab (Chancel, Piketty, Saez, Zucman): the top 10% of humanity owns roughly 75% of all personal wealth, and the top 0.001% — fewer than 60,000 people — owns three times more wealth than the entire bottom half of humanity combined.
- Global military spending, 2024: $2.7 trillion (SIPRI) — 10th consecutive annual increase.
- Global health spending, 2022: $9.8 trillion (WHO), but the US alone accounts for 43%. Per-capita health spending in high-income countries is ~87× that in low-income countries — same disease, different price tag.
"We cannot afford it" is a statement about political will, not about physical resources or aggregate money supply.
4 · Three kinds of scarcity
Not all scarcity is fake. An honest version of this argument has to separate three distinct things, because the policy response to each is different.
Physical scarcity real
Some things are genuinely finite or geographically bound: rare-earth elements, helium, the lithium in a specific salt flat, doctor-hours per day, intact tropical forest, a particular human's time, fresh water in a desert. No amount of redistribution conjures these. They require substitution, recycling, or restraint.
Distribution scarcity solvable
Production exceeds need globally, but the surplus is concentrated where need is lowest. Food rots in one country while another starves. Electricity is curtailed in one grid while another has none. Housing units sit empty in cities where people sleep outside them. This is the largest category by far. It is solved with logistics, pricing, and rights — not with more production.
Manufactured scarcity created
A third category exists because someone profits from it existing:
- IP gates on near-zero-marginal-cost goods. A generic insulin vial costs roughly $2–$6 to manufacture; the list price in the US has reached $300+. The molecule isn't scarce. The legal right to copy it is.
- Artificial limited editions. Sneakers, handbags, NFTs, "drops" — supply could be infinite; scarcity is the product.
- Planned obsolescence and repair lockouts. A working device is made non-working to manufacture replacement demand.
- Zoning that forbids new housing in places where people want to live.
- Information asymmetry. The "scarcity" of expertise often survives only because the knowledge is paywalled or trade-secreted.
Manufactured scarcity is the part of the system that is most legibly a choice. It is the easiest to argue about and the hardest to dislodge, because someone is profiting on the other side of the choice.
5 · The Omelas question
In 1973 Ursula K. Le Guin published a short story called The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas. Omelas is a city of beauty, music, and abundant joy. Every citizen's happiness depends — they are told on coming of age — on the continuous suffering of one child kept locked in a basement. The reader is given the choice: accept the bargain, or walk away. Le Guin never tells you what waits past the city walls. (background)
The current global system has the shape of Omelas at scale. Roughly a billion people live in conditions of relative abundance — durable shelter, clean water, reliable food, electricity, healthcare, leisure — while 847M live in extreme poverty, 2.8B in inadequate housing, and 673M in hunger. The wealthy world's comfort runs on cobalt mined by children, garments sewn in unsafe factories, agricultural labor below legal wages, and ecosystems converted to commodities. The bargain isn't presented to anyone formally. It is just the condition of the city.
Le Guin's story poses the bargain. It does not assert that the bargain is necessary. The interesting question — the empirical question this site can actually address — is whether the suffering is load-bearing. If you removed the child from the basement, would Omelas collapse? Or has the city simply never tried?
Three lines of evidence say the suffering is not load-bearing:
- Cash transfers do not reduce labor supply. Every well-designed evaluation we have — Kenya, Iran, Stockton, Alaska — finds either no labor-supply effect or a positive one. The widely-feared "people will stop working if you give them money" version of the Omelas bargain is not supported by data. (See §6 below for sources.)
- High-comfort societies exist without correspondingly high underclass exploitation. The Nordic countries, Costa Rica, and several others sustain top-tier human development with lower internal inequality and lower foreign-supply-chain abuse profiles than the US, UK, or Gulf states. The luxuries are the same; the basement isn't.
- Extractive vs inclusive institutions. The empirical literature on long-run growth (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2024 Nobel) finds that inclusive institutions — broad property rights, broad political voice, broad access to opportunity — outperform extractive ones over decades. The basement is not the engine. The basement is the failure mode.
That doesn't make removing the child easy. Transition costs are real — capital flight, political resistance, the need to reorganize entire supply chains. But "hard" is not the same as "load-bearing." The site's claim is narrow: the resources exist, the cash-transfer experiments work, and the basement-comfort link is contingent, not necessary.
The next section is the part of Omelas that the story didn't write: what happens when you actually try to lift the child out, on a recorded, measured scale.
6 · Where this has already been done
Four programs, four geographies, four study designs — each with peer-reviewed or official-source evaluation. None of them is the full solution. Together they show that the standard objections ("people will stop working," "the money will be wasted," "it isn't sustainable") fail empirically at the scales tested.
GiveDirectly Universal Basic Income — rural Kenya (2017–ongoing)
Three-arm randomized controlled trial run by Tavneet Suri (MIT), Abhijit Banerjee (MIT, Nobel 2019), Paul Niehaus (UCSD), Alan Krueger (Princeton), and Michael Faye. Three transfer designs compared: lump sum $500; two-year monthly UBI ($0.75/day); twelve-year commitment, same monthly amount.
- No reduction in labor supply in any arm.
- Lump-sum arm produced the largest income gain (~50% over control).
- Long-term commitment changed behavior — saving, business creation — that short-term transfers did not.
Banerjee, Faye, Krueger, Niehaus, Suri (2023). Universal Basic Income: Short-Term Results from a Long-Term Experiment in Kenya. · AEA registry
Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend — United States (1982–present)
A sovereign-wealth fund: 25% of state oil-and-mineral royalties go into a trust ($80B+ in assets) that pays an annual dividend to every Alaska resident, including children. 2024 payment: $1,702. 2022 record: $3,284. The program has survived 40+ years, four decades of party turnover, and multiple oil-price downturns.
- No measurable reduction in aggregate labor supply (Jones & Marinescu 2022, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy).
- Alaska maintains the lowest poverty rate among comparable rural-heavy US states.
- Demonstrates that universal, unconditional, lifetime cash distribution is administratively trivial when the political mechanism exists.
Alaska Department of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Division · Jones & Marinescu, AEJ:EP 14(2):315–340
Iran Universal Cash Transfer — Iran (2011)
Replaced ~$50–70B/year of energy and bread subsidies with universal monthly cash deposits into individual accounts. Within the first year, >$30B in cash was disbursed to essentially the entire population. The largest universal cash program ever attempted.
- Headcount poverty fell from 22.5% → 10.6% as a direct effect of the transfer.
- No reduction in labor supply; positive effects on women's and self-employed men's labor supply (Salehi-Isfahani & Mostafavi-Dehzooei 2018, J. Dev. Econ.).
- Critical lesson: the nominal value was not indexed to inflation. After five years of cumulative 136.5% inflation, real value of the transfer was cut in half and ~40% of the poverty-reduction effect was lost. Indexing matters.
Salehi-Isfahani & Mostafavi-Dehzooei, J. Dev. Econ. 135:349 · IMF Working Paper 11/167
Stockton SEED — Stockton, CA (2019–2021)
Stockton Economic Empowerment Demonstration. Mayor Michael Tubbs launched it; University of Pennsylvania's Center for Guaranteed Income Research and Stanford's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences ran the evaluation. Mixed-methods RCT.
- Full-time employment rose from 28% to 40% in the treatment group over twelve months. The control group rose 32% → 37%. Net effect: +7 percentage points of full-time employment.
- Reduced anxiety and depression scores.
- Most recipients used funds for groceries, utilities, transportation, and auto repair — not "temptation goods."
West, Castro, Samra, Coltrera (2023), J. Urban Health 100:1184 · First-year report
Bolsa Família — Brazil (2003–present)
The largest conditional cash transfer program ever implemented. Transfers are tied to school enrollment and health-clinic visits for children, but at the scale of nearly a quarter of a national population over more than two decades.
- Extreme poverty in Brazil would be 33–50% higher without the program (World Bank evaluation).
- Accounted for 12–21% of the recent sharp decline in Brazilian income inequality.
- No measurable negative effect on labor force participation (Soares et al, multiple evaluations).
- The program survived three presidencies of opposing parties, including a government that publicly opposed it — and was reinstated in expanded form under Lula 2023.
World Bank, 'Lifting Families out of Poverty in Brazil: Bolsa Familia Program' · IMF WP/20/099 evaluation
Cherokee casino dividend — Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, NC, USA (1996–present)
A naturally occurring quasi-experiment. In 1996 the Eastern Band of Cherokee opened a casino and decided to distribute a per-capita share of profits to every enrolled member, including children. This intersected with the ongoing Great Smoky Mountains Study of childhood mental health — 1,420 children including 350 Cherokee — giving researchers a randomized- by-tribal-membership comparison.
- Cherokee children in poverty fell by half by 2001; behavioral and emotional problems in formerly-poor children dropped 40% to match never-poor levels.
- Each additional $4,000/year correlated with one extra year of educational attainment by age 21 and a 22% reduction in criminal record by age 16.
- Effects intergenerational: children whose families joined the dividend at younger ages showed lasting decade-plus benefits.
Costello, E.J. et al (2020). 'Income dividends and subjective survival in a Cherokee Indian cohort.' SSM-Population Health 10:100530 · earlier work: Costello, Compton, Keeler, Angold (2003), JAMA 290(15):2023–9.
And the meta-analyses confirm it
Individual studies can be cherry-picked. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses can't. Two of them, both peer-reviewed, both covering the full literature, both reaching the same conclusion:
- Crosta, Karlan, Ong, Rüschenpöhler, Udry (2024). Bayesian meta-analysis of 114 studies across 72 unconditional cash transfer programs in low- and middle-income countries. Strong positive average effects on 10 of 13 outcomes measured: household consumption, food security, monthly income, labor supply, school enrollment, psychological wellbeing, total assets, financial assets, and child height-for-age. (SSRN preprint, 2024)
- Bastagli, Hagen-Zanker, Harman, Barca, Sturge, Schmidt, Pellerano (2016). ODI Rigorous Review. 15 years of literature (2000–2015), 165 studies, 35 indicators, 6 outcome areas. Conclusion: "There is no systematic evidence that cash transfers reduce adult labour supply, despite this often being a concern raised by policymakers and the public." (ODI, July 2016)
Together: a meta-analysis of 114 studies and a systematic review of 165 studies, both finding the same result that the six individual pilots above find. The objection "people will stop working" is, in 2026, no longer a serious empirical claim. It is a folk belief.
The pilots are not identical — different amounts, durations, countries, conditions, evaluation methods. They converge on one point: when you give people money without conditions, they do not stop working, do not waste it, and their lives measurably improve. The objection "this can't work" is now an empirical claim with six counterexamples, a 114-study meta-analysis, and a 165-study systematic review against it.
For country-scale precedents — Costa Rica abolishing its military, Norway saving its oil money, Iceland prosecuting its bankers, Bhutan rewriting its objective function, Mauritius diversifying without dismantling its welfare state — see Abundance · country case studies →.
7 · Move the dials yourself
This widget is a calculator, not a forecast. It shows what the per-capita numbers become when you redirect parts of existing flows. Math is the same arithmetic used in §3, recomputed live; every input value is a real published figure (UBS 2024, SIPRI 2024, IMF 2026, World Bank 2025).
This calculator is deliberately simple. It does not model: capital flight from wealth taxation, military-industry employment displacement, monetary effects of issuing $X trillion, or the regional distribution gap between where food is wasted and where people are hungry. Those are real costs — the calculator's purpose is to show that aggregate funding is in the achievable range, not to claim transition is free.
Embed this calculator on any site:
embed/ has a one-line <iframe> snippet.
Public domain, no attribution required.
8 · Historical context — work as a recent system
Asking "can we afford to work less" presumes that working most of one's waking hours is the human default. It isn't. For the first ~290,000 years of anatomically modern humans, there was no employment, no wage, no clock, and no possibility of being fired.
The standard reference is Richard B. Lee's 1963–1965 fieldwork with the Ju/'hoansi (Dobe !Kung) of Botswana, presented at the 1966 Man the Hunter symposium at the University of Chicago. He recorded adults spending ~12–19 hours per week on food acquisition. Comparable figures have since been reported for the Hadza, Aché, and Martu on three other continents.
The honest caveat: Lee's figure is food-acquisition only. When food processing, tool-making, childcare, water-hauling, and camp maintenance are included, the total comes to roughly 40 hours/week — similar to a modern job. The historically novel thing is not that humans invented work. It is that humans invented a system where the value of your labor is extracted by someone else, and where the labor required to access food and shelter became disconnected from the labor that produces them.
Three other facts, each from peer-reviewed primary sources, are worth knowing:
- Firelight changes what humans talk about. Polly Wiessner's 2014 PNAS study of Ju/'hoansi conversation found that daytime talk was 31% economic and 6% stories. After dark, by firelight, stories rose to 81% while economic talk collapsed to 4%. The leisure portion of the day is where culture is produced — myth, music, history, identity. (PNAS 111(39):14027)
- Human sleep was not originally a single block. Historian A. Roger Ekirch documented over 500 pre-industrial references to "first sleep" and "second sleep" with a wakeful interval between them. Thomas Wehr's 1992 NIMH experiment, confining seven men to 14 hours of darkness per night, reproduced this pattern spontaneously after about three weeks. The single 8-hour block is an artifact of artificial light and industrial scheduling. (Ekirch 2024; Wehr, J. Sleep Research 1(2):103.)
- Agriculture, measured against the bone record, made humans smaller and sicker — and bound them to more labor, not less. Bioarchaeological reviews (Larsen 1995; Cohen & Armelagos 1984) consistently find shorter stature, more dental caries, more osteoarthritis, and more nutritional deficiency in early agriculturalists vs. the hunter-gatherer populations they replaced. The skeletons are very clear about this. Working more did not produce healthier humans.
None of this is an argument to return to caves. It is one argument: the framework where most of life is wage labor to access basic survival is ~0.04% of human history. It is a recent system, not a permanent fact. Combined with the per-capita arithmetic above — that aggregate global production now exceeds aggregate need — it raises a fair question about how much of that system is currently required, and how much is inherited.
See papers/historical-context.md
for the full source notes, including the substantial revision to Lee's
numbers, the Sahlins "original affluent society" debate, and what
evidence we deliberately excluded.
9 · Honest limits of this page
What this page does not prove:
- It does not prove that money can be abolished. Money is a coordination technology; whether to keep it is a separate question from whether the underlying resources exist.
- It does not prove that UBI / UHI is politically feasible. Demonstrating that the bill is payable is different from demonstrating that it will be paid.
- It does not handle transport, refrigeration, infrastructure, governance, and conflict — all of which convert a global surplus into a local shortage. These are real costs, not accounting tricks.
- Aggregate per-capita averages hide distribution. "Enough exists" is a necessary condition for "everyone has enough," not a sufficient one.
- The pilot evidence is for transfers measured at thousands to millions of people over months to years. Universal global rollout is a larger step, and second-order effects (inflation, capital flight, sovereignty) would emerge that the pilots could not have captured.
- Production data has measurement error and political bias. Numbers here reflect what major institutions publish; the institutions are not neutral.
What this page does prove: the common claim that humanity cannot physically produce enough food, water, electricity, or output to meet every human's basic needs is, in 2026, factually wrong. Whatever else stops us, it is not the soil, the rivers, the grids, or the GDP.
10 · Common objections, answered
The objections to "we already produce enough" tend to recur. Each of the following has been raised in good faith and has an empirical answer.
"If we give people a universal income, won't they stop working?"
No. Every well-designed evaluation finds either no labor-supply effect or a positive one.
- GiveDirectly's Kenya RCT (~23k people, three transfer designs) — no labor reduction in any arm (Banerjee et al 2023).
- Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (every Alaskan, 40+ years) — no aggregate labor reduction (Jones & Marinescu 2022, AEJ:EP).
- Iran 2011 universal cash transfer (>70M people) — no labor reduction, positive effects on women and self-employed men (Salehi-Isfahani & Mostafavi-Dehzooei 2018, JDE).
- Stockton SEED (125 treatment vs 200 control, RCT) — full-time employment rose 12pp in treatment vs 5pp in control (West et al 2023, J. Urban Health).
"Where would the money actually come from?"
A universal $3/day floor for every human is $8.98T/year, or 8.2% of world GDP. Reservoirs from which it could be drawn:
- Global household wealth: $449.9T (UBS 2024); $213.8T held by ~58M people with net worth >$1M. A 2% annual tax on this top tier alone yields ~$4.3T.
- Global military spending: $2.7T/year (SIPRI 2024); 10% redirection = $270B/year.
- Profit-shifting to tax havens: estimated $480–700B/year of corporate profit relocated to evade tax (Tørsløv, Wier & Zucman 2018; OECD has the Pillar Two minimum-tax framework partially live).
- Closing the actual poverty gap for the 847M below the line costs well under $1T/year — comparable to a single year's growth in global military spending.
The site's §7 calculator lets you stress-test any combination.
"Wouldn't inflation just eat any universal transfer?"
It can, if the transfer is not indexed. Iran 2011 demonstrated this empirically: cumulative 136.5% inflation over five years halved the real value of the transfer and erased ~40% of its poverty-reduction effect (Salehi-Isfahani 2018). The lesson is that indexing matters; it is not a refutation of the concept. The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, which fluctuates with fund performance rather than being fixed in nominal terms, has held real value over 40+ years.
"Doesn't a wealth tax cause capital flight?"
Some, but typically much less than predicted, because most wealth is in illiquid assets (real estate, business ownership, retirement accounts) that cannot be moved as easily as cash. Gabriel Zucman's research estimates ~$7.6T of household wealth is offshore — recoverable through coordinated tax-haven enforcement, an active item on the OECD/G20 agenda (Pillar Two minimum tax took partial effect 2024). The site's §7 calculator does not model capital flight, and the limits section explicitly notes this.
"Isn't GDP-per-capita just an average that hides distribution?"
Yes — and the site says so in §6 of the methodology and §9 of the limits. GDP is not income. It includes capital depreciation, government spending, and net exports. Average per-capita figures show that the aggregate physical resource is sufficient, which is a necessary precondition for distribution. It is not a sufficient condition. The page exists to refute "we cannot produce enough," not to claim "distribution is solved."
"Won't lifting people out of poverty cause a population explosion?"
The opposite is empirically observed. Fertility rates fall as women gain education, healthcare access, and income — the demographic transition. The UN's medium-variant projection (WPP 2024) is that global population peaks around 10.3B in the mid-2080s and declines thereafter. Lifting people out of poverty accelerates fertility decline, not population growth.
"Doesn't innovation require inequality?"
The empirical literature on long-run growth — most notably Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2024 Nobel Prize in Economics) — finds that inclusive institutions (broad property rights, broad political voice, broad opportunity) outperform extractive ones over decades. The Nordic countries combine top-quintile innovation output per capita with low inequality.
Beyond growth, Wilkinson & Pickett's The Spirit Level (2009) documented across 23 rich democracies that for eleven distinct health and social outcomes — physical health, mental health, drug abuse, educational achievement, imprisonment rates, obesity, social mobility, social trust, violence, teenage pregnancy, and child well-being — more equal societies do measurably better, regardless of average income. The work has critics (cross-sectional rather than causal, omitted variables) but the descriptive pattern across 11 outcomes is robust and has been replicated across multiple data sets. (Equality Trust · Wilkinson & Pickett, The Spirit Level, Allen Lane, 2009.)
The argument that extreme inequality is required for innovation is not supported by cross-country evidence. The opposite case — that very high inequality impairs human-capital formation, trust, and political stability — has stronger empirical support.
"Isn't this communism?"
Tax-and-transfer is what every modern developed country already does. The arithmetic on this page is independent of political ideology — it asks whether physical production exceeds physical need, then quantifies redistribution costs. Universal basic income proposals span the political spectrum: Milton Friedman (negative income tax), F.A. Hayek (a minimum income), Martin Luther King Jr., Richard Nixon (1969 Family Assistance Plan), Andrew Yang, GiveDirectly's RCT, and Alaska's bipartisan Permanent Fund. The site shows the math and the pilots; it does not advocate a political program.
"Geographic distribution makes the global average meaningless. Water in the Sahara is not water in the Amazon."
True, and the site says exactly this — water gets the geographically uneven tag in §2 and transport/refrigeration is the first item in §9 (limits). The 287× water ratio is an aggregate-supply claim, not a local-supply claim. The food ratio (1.4×) and electricity ratio (3.8×) are less geographically locked because both can move at reasonable cost. The Omelas argument (§5) is even narrower: the resources exist physically; the question is whether institutions move them.
11 · Sources & methodology
All raw values live in
data/essentials.json,
pilot programs in
data/pilots.json,
country case studies in
data/case-studies.json,
and the per-country drill-down in
data/countries.json.
Every entry has citation, year, and unit. The on-page math is transparent:
every ratio is a single division of two of those values.
Full methodology — what was included, what was excluded, where averages mask
inequality — is in
methodology.md.
Want the full academic literature?
bibliography.md has 60+ scholarly
references organized by topic — Sen on famines, Piketty/Zucman/Saez on
inequality, Banerjee/Duflo/Suri on cash transfers (with the two systematic
reviews), Acemoglu/Robinson on institutions, Ostrom on commons, Wilkinson &
Pickett on inequality and outcomes, plus the canonical anthropology and
demography. If you want to argue with the page, that file is where the
citations behind each claim live.
If you find a number on this page that conflicts with its cited source, or has been superseded by a newer publication, please open an issue or PR on the GitHub repository. This page exists to be corrected.